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J. WILLIAM CALLISON*
Why a Fiduciary Duty Shift to Creditors of
Insolvent Business Entities is Incorrect
as a Matter of Theory and Practice
IT IS A MANTRA THAT DIRECTORS OWE FIDUCIARY DUTIES of care and loyalty to the
corporation and its shareholders. The duty of care requires directors to exercise
appropriate diligence in making decisions, taking other actions, and in monitoring
corporate management.' The duty of loyalty generally requires the director, as a
corporate agent, to subordinate his or her interests to those of the corporation. It is
the loyalty duty that requires directors to refrain from using corporate assets for
personal gain, usurping corporate opportunities, competing with the corporation,
dealing with the corporation as or on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to
the corporation, and other similar acts.2
Both shareholders and creditors supply capital to the corporation. Creditors have
fixed claims against the corporation, entitling them to receive repayment of their
principal, with interest, at a specified time. Shareholders have the right to partici-
pate in firm profits through dividends, as they may be declared by the directors,
and to share in residual assets (i.e., assets remaining after creditor payment) upon
dissolution. Although noncorporate business organizations, such as partnerships,
limited partnerships, and limited liability companies, may not have the same role
denominations, similar concepts apply and such firms have equity holders, entitled
to distributions and to share in residual assets, and may have creditors, entitled to
fixed payments of principal and interest. Because equityholders and creditors have
different rights, they often have different interests. For example, shareholders may
prefer larger dividend payments and riskier investments to maximize the value of
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their residual interest, while creditors may prefer that the corporation refrain from
current distributions and from transactions that place assets at risk.
The probability and magnitude of the interest conflict between equityholders
and creditors increase in the case of unsuccessful firms in which the financial con-
dition deteriorates and the debt-equity ratio increases. Among the conflicts beset-
ting the unsuccessful firm are the level of risk that should be taken with respect to
the firm's ongoing business, the amount of investment that should be made in new
firm activities, and, ultimately, the question of whether to maintain the firm as a
going concern or to cease business altogether and liquidate the firm's assets.' Be-
cause shareholders do not have personal liability for obligations that cannot be met
by the firm, their downside risk is minimal, and they may adopt a gambler's
mentality and seek high-risk/high-reward uses of firm assets in new activities that
may provide equity in the future.4 In addition, shareholders will generally seek to
avoid liquidation. On the other hand, some creditors (but possibly not all credi-
tors) may prefer that the firm take a risk-averse approach because they will obtain
little benefit if the ventures succeed and may suffer further loss in asset value if they
fail. In addition, they may desire that the firm liquidate and pay its assets to them
forthwith.
Because creditors of insolvent firms may view themselves as the only persons
with valid interests in the firm's remaining current assets, it is understandable that
they might argue that it is inappropriate for directors to allow the firm to gamble
with those assets. Creditors may also be so risk-averse, however, that they are un-
willing to allow the firm to make reasonable investments that would increase the
expected value of the firm and return it to solvency. In such a case, creditors would
bear the entire cost of a losing investment while their economic upside is limited to
the amount owed them. As policymakers, corporate directors make decisions af-
fecting both shareholder and creditor interests. Not surprisingly, directors can be-
3. The question whether fiduciary obligations should be extended to creditors can be viewed as an agency
question in which management issues arguably cannot be resolved satisfactorily by the firm's directors and
officers, at least as long as they consider only the shareholders' interests. See Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305,
308 (1976); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 327,
330 (1983). The interests of persons involved with the firm may differ such that issue resolution may benefit
persons who are empowered to select the board of directors (i.e., the shareholders) to the detriment of those
who are not so empowered (i.e., the creditors). Numerous scholars have noted the moral hazard inherent in
this setting. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932); see also Fama & Jensen, supra, at 331; Jensen & Meckling, supra, at 308. Recent scholarship
has focused on how exclusively corporations and other business organizations should be managed to maximize
the equity owners' wealth. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999), reprinted in Symposium: Team Production in Business Organizations,
24 J. CORP. L. 743, 751 (1999) (including commentary from other authors).
4. This would also be the case for other limited liability firms, such as limited liability partnerships
(LLPs), limited liability limited partnerships (LLLPs), and limited liability companies (LLCs). In the case of
"regular" general partnerships and limited partnerships, the agency problem is limited because at least one
general partner has personal liability for the firm's debts and obligations.
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
J. WILLIAM CALLISON
come whipsawed between these conflicting interests, and questions of whether
directors owe duties to shareholders or to creditors, as well as questions of who can
enforce the directors' duties, become paramount in the case of financially troubled
organizations.
It has also become commonplace to state that when a corporation is in financial
distress, which is typically based on a determination that it is insolvent or perhaps
in the zone of insolvency, the duties of care and loyalty that normally run from
directors to the corporation for the benefit of its shareholders' shift to the corpora-
tion's creditors.' This conclusion is founded in the Delaware Chancery Court's
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.7 case, contin-
ues through its decision in Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co.,' and finds its most
recent expression in the Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc.9
decision. Courts in other states have followed Delaware's lead, holding that direc-
tors of insolvent firms owe fiduciary duties to their creditors. One of the less well-
reasoned cases,"5 decided by the Colorado Court of Appeals, has generated an effort
to reverse the trend through legislation intended to eliminate fiduciary duties to
creditors. These developments will be discussed later in this Article. Credit Lyonnais
and its offspring have also generated considerable academic attention, much of it
5. See Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986). There, the court held:
This case does not involve the measurement of corporate or directorial conduct against that high
standard of fidelity required of fiduciaries when they act with respect to the interests of the benefi-
ciaries of their trust. Under our law-and the law generally-the relationship between a corporation
and the holders of its debt securities, even convertible debt securities, is contractual in nature. Ar-
rangements among a corporation, the underwriters of its debt, trustees under its indentures and
sometimes ultimate investors are typically thoroughly negotiated and massively documented. The
rights and obligations of the various parties are or should be spelled out in that documentation. The
terms of the contractual relationship agreed to and not broad concepts such as fairness define the
corporation's obligation to its bondholders.
Thus, the first aspect of the pending Exchange Offers about which plaintiff complains-that
"the purpose and effect of the Exchange Offers is to benefit Oak's common stockholders at the ex-
pense of the Holders of its debt"-does not itself appear to allege a cognizable legal wrong. It is the
obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the corpora-
tion's stockholders; that they may sometimes do so "at the expense" of others (even assuming that a
transaction which one may refuse to enter into can meaningfully be said to be at his expense) does
not for that reason constitute a breach of duty. It seems likely that corporate restructurings designed
to maximize shareholder values may in some instances have the effect of requiring bondholders to
bear greater risk of loss and thus in effect transfer economic value from bondholders to stockholders.
But if courts are to provide protection against such enhanced risk, they will require either legislative
direction to do so or the negotiation of indenture provisions designed to afford such protection.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
6. See, e.g., Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of Distressed Corporations, 7
GEO. MAsoN. L. REv. 45, 63 (1998) (stating that "[tihe majority rule, and the law in Delaware, is that, upon
insolvency, a board's duties are owed to the creditors of the enterprise" [footnote omitted]).
7. Civ A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
8. 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992).
9. 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
10. See Anstine v. Alexander, No. 03CA1037, 2005 WL 913503 (Colo. App. Apr. 21, 2005), cert. granted,
2006 WL 390192 (Colo. Feb. 21, 2006).
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focused on when the fiduciary obligation shifts to creditors, rather than whether
fiduciary obligations should shift to creditors at all. In this Article, I consider the
"whether" question and conclude that there should not be a "creditor shift" even
when a corporation or other business entity is insolvent.
The Article proceeds as follows: First, it considers the seminal Delaware cases
concerning fiduciary duties to creditors in insolvency situations. Second, it reviews
developments in Colorado, where a court has taken an extreme view concerning
fiduciary duties to creditors. Third, it considers theoretical reasons that fiduciary
duties should not be owed to creditors. Finally, it sets forth several practical reasons
that duties should not be owed to creditors and shows the nuisance created when
courts cause a shift in fiduciary duties from shareholders, where they belong, to
creditors, where they do not. The Article concludes that this particular form of
judicial activism is not well-founded and should be reversed.
I. THE DELAWARE CHANCERY CASES
A. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.A. v. Pathe Communications Corp.
In Credit Lyonnais, then-Chancellor William Allen rejected a controlling share-
holder's claim that corporate directors, all of whom were members of an executive
committee appointed by the corporation's creditors pursuant to a loan agreement,
disregarded his interests by failing to facilitate sales transactions that he sought in
order to help him regain control of the corporation. 2 The court concluded that,
[aft least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board
of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers [i.e., the share-
holders], but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.
The Ladd management [group] was not disloyal in not immediately facili-
tating whatever asset sales were in the financial best interest of the controlling
stockholder. In managing the business affairs of MGM, Mr. Ladd and those he
appointed owed their supervening loyalty to MGM, the corporate entity. It was
not disloyal for them to consider carefully the corporation's interest in the...
transaction .... But the MGM board or its executive committee had an obli-
gation to the community of interest that sustained the corporation, to exercise
judgment in an informed, good faith effort to maximize the corporation's long-
term wealth creating capacity.3
11. See, e.g., Ramesh K.S. Rao et al., Fiduciary Duty a la Lyonnais: An Economic Perspective on Corporate
Governance in a Financially Distressed Firm, 22 J. CORP. L. 53 (1996) (focusing on the timing problem). Other
commentators have considered whether fiduciary duties should arise. See, e.g., Ann E. Conaway Stilson, Reex-
amining the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining Directors' Duties to Creditors,
20 DEL. 1. CORP. L. 1 (1995); Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors' Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the
Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189 (2003).
12. Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *33 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
13. Id. at *34 (footnotes omitted).
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Although this statement can be interpreted to imply that directors in insolvency
cases owe fiduciary duties to creditors, a narrower construction of the Credit Lyon-
nais holding is that shareholders may not be able to succeed in asserting that direc-
tors of corporations acting "in the vicinity of insolvency" did not consider only
shareholder interests in reaching their decisions. The court did not address direc-
tors' obligations to creditors in the case of insolvent corporations, and they are
presumably at least as stringent as those with respect to corporations that are in the
"zone."
The theory underlying the Credit Lyonnais holding is not entirely clear, but it
appears to be grounded in considerations of economic efficiency. In a famous foot-
note, Chancellor Allen suggested that a board of directors, faced with the question
whether to accept a settlement offer in a case on appeal against a solvent debtor,
could take one of three courses: (1) a very risky course, with a low success
probability, that would produce the greatest return and leave significant share-
holder equity; (2) a moderately risky course that would provide a higher success
probability but a lower return, such that creditors would be paid in full but share-
holders would have less equity; and (3) a least risky course that would pay creditors
in full but would leave no shareholder equity. 4 Chancellor Allen postulated that
the most efficient approach with the most likely overall benefit for the corporation
would be the moderately risky approach, but that a shareholder primacy approach
would cause directors to choose the riskiest course while a creditor primacy ap-
proach would cause directors to choose the most risk-averse course. 5 Chancellor
Allen wrote:
The possibility of insolvency can do curious things to incentives, exposing
creditors to risks of opportunistic behavior and creating complexities for direc-
tors .... While in fact the stockholders' preference would reflect their appetite
for risk, it is possible (and with diversified shareholders likely) that sharehold-
ers would prefer rejection of both settlement offers.
But if we consider the community of interests that the corporation represents
it seems apparent that one should in this hypothetical accept the best settle-
ment offer available providing it is greater than $15.55 million, and one below
that amount should be rejected. But that result will not be reached by a direc-
tor who thinks he owes duties directly to shareholders only. It will be reached
by directors who are capable of conceiving of the corporation as a legal and
economic entity. Such directors will recognize that in managing the business
affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may
arise when the right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the
corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockholders (or the creditors,
14. Id. at *34 n.55.
15. Id.
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or the employees, or any single group interested in the corporation) would
make if given the opportunity to act.6
Simply put, Credit Lyonnais empowers directors of corporations that are in the
zone of insolvency to strike a balance in an attempt to reach a fair and efficient
result, without fear of a fiduciary breach to shareholders whose interests, consid-
ered alone, would force excessively risky "bet the ranch, go for broke" decisions.
Although the case did not involve creditor claims, it also appears to empower direc-
tors of corporations in the zone of insolvency to make decisions without fear of a
fiduciary breach to those creditors whose interests, considered alone, would force
an excessively cautious "stay the course, preserve existing assets at all costs" ap-
proach. Credit Lyonnais leaves unanswered, however, the question of who can en-
force the fiduciary duties that are owed to the corporate enterprise in zone of
insolvency settings. It also leaves unanswered the question of duties in corporations
that have descended into actual insolvency.
B. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co.
In Geyer, the Chancery Court took the next step down the "creditor shift" path, at
least with respect to insolvent corporations (as opposed to corporations in the zone
of insolvency). With respect to a creditor's claim that a director breached his fiduci-
ary duties, the court held:
[T]he general rule is that directors do not owe creditors duties beyond the
relevant contractual terms absent "special circumstances ... e.g., fraud, insol-
vency, or a violation of a statute .... Furthermore, neither party seriously
disputes that when the insolvency exception does arise, it creates fiduciary
duties for directors for the benefit of creditors. Therefore, the issue the par-
ties present to me is when do directors' fiduciary duties to creditors arise via
insolvency. That is, I must decide whether insolvency arises so as to create a
fiduciary duty to creditors when insolvency exists in fact or when a party insti-
tutes statutory proceedings (e.g., bankruptcy proceedings).7
The court ruled that insolvency in fact, rather than insolvency due to a statutory
filing, causes fiduciary duties to shift to creditors,"8 but in accepting that the parties
did not dispute that a shift occurs, the court did not state any basis for its holding
that the shift occurs.
16. Id.
17. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992) (first emphasis added) (citations and
footnote omitted). At least one court has viewed Geyer as standing for the proposition that, upon insolvency,
director duties shift from shareholders to creditors exclusively. In re Toy King Distribs., Inc., 256 B.R. 1, 166-67
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000).
18. Geyer, 621 A.2d at 787-88.
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C. Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc.
The recent Production Resources Group case substantially expands on Credit Lyon-
nais. An insolvent corporation's judgment creditor alleged that the corporation's
board of directors and a nondirector officer committed various fiduciary
breaches.' 9 The creditor argued that because the corporation was insolvent, (i) the
creditor could bring a fiduciary claim in its capacity as creditor, and (ii) the credi-
tor could do so directly rather than derivatively and without overcoming exculpa-
tory charter provisions protecting directors from claims that they breached their
duty of care.2"
The court first noted that creditors typically may not allege fiduciary claims
against corporate directors, because creditors are presumed capable of protecting
themselves by contract and because fraudulent conveyance law and bankruptcy law
protects them.' Thus, the court stated that corporate law expects that the directors
of a solvent corporation will cause the firm to undertake economic activities to
maximize the benefit to the stockholders, who are the firm's residual risk bearers.22
Nothing new here.
The court then correctly noted that Credit Lyonnais does not create a new body
of creditors' rights law in zone-of-insolvency situations, but instead provides a
shield protecting directors from shareholders' claims that the directors have a fidu-
ciary obligation to undertake riskier activities for the shareholders' potential benefit
as long as the company does not breach any legal obligations to creditors. 3 Al-
though the court recognized that some commentators and courts have read Credit
Lyonnais expansively to permit creditors of a firm that is in the zone of insolvency
to challenge directors' business judgments as a breach of fiduciary duties owed to
creditors, 4 the court concluded that the facts of Production Resources did not re-
quire it to "explore the metaphysical boundaries of the zone of insolvency."2" In
19. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 775 (Del. Ch. 2004).
20. Id. at 775.
21. Id. at 787. Some commentators have argued that directors should be fiduciaries of other corporate
constituents, such as bondholders and employees. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corpo-
rate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1168 (1990) (bondholders); Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the
Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REv.
1189, 1235 (1991) (employees). These arguments have gained little traction and are beyond the scope of this
Article.
22. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 787.
23. Id. at 788.
24. Id. at 789. The court refers to such a construction of Credit Lyonnais as "[slomewhat odd[ ]." Id. at
787-88.
25. Id. at 790. The court notes that if creditors have standing to bring derivative claims in the zone of
insolvency, they will share that standing with stockholders and that this leads to possible derivative litigation by
two sets of plaintiffs with starkly different conceptions of what is best for the firm. Further, the court states that
it is often difficult to determine insolvency and that defining the zone of insolvency would be even more
difficult. Plaintiffs' lawyers would press for an expansive view and because pleadings (e.g., motions to dismiss
and motions for summary judgment) are approached in a plaintiff-friendly manner, creditors would be able to
obtain discovery (and presumably settlement leverage) even in situations where the corporation is ultimately
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Production Resources, the court held that the creditor adequately pled that the cor-
poration was insolvent in fact.26 Notwithstanding his recognition that his zone-of-
insolvency language is dictum, Vice-Chancellor Strine then strayed from Credit Ly-
onnais and stated, "I doubt the wisdom of a judicial endeavor to second-guess
good-faith director conduct in the so-called zone."27 It will be interesting to see
whether Vice Chancellor Strine's conservative approach holds the day in future
zone-of-insolvency cases.
After its lengthy zone-of-insolvency dictum, the court reached its holding in the
case:
When a firm has reached the point of insolvency, it is settled that under
Delaware law, the firm's directors are said to owe fiduciary duties to the
company's creditors. This is an uncontroversial proposition and does not com-
pletely turn on its head the equitable obligations of the directors to the firm
itself The directors continue to have the task of attempting to maximize the
economic value of the firm. That much of their job does not change. But the
fact of insolvency does necessarily affect the constituency on whose behalf the
directors are pursuing that end. By definition, the fact of insolvency places the
creditors in the shoes normally occupied by the shareholders-that of residual
risk-bearers. Where the assets of the company are insufficient to pay its debts,
and the remaining equity is underwater, whatever remains of the company's
determined to be solvent and not even in the "zone." Id. at 789 n.56. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming
Found. v. Gheewalla, No. Civ. A. 1456-N, 2006 WL 2588971, at *11 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2006) (holding that
creditors may not bring direct claims for actions arising when the corporation is in the zone of insolvency).
The court held that neither an "incentive-to-enforce rationale" nor "trust fund theory" support an extension of
direct creditor claims to zone of insolvency settings. Id. at "12. The court did, however, note in dictum that the
"incentive-to-enforce rationale" might extend to derivative claims occurring while the corporation is in the
zone of insolvency. Id.
26. Id. at 783. The court defined insolvency as either (1) "a deficiency of assets below liabilities with no
reasonable prospect that the business can be successfully continued in the face thereof" or (2) "an inability to meet
maturing obligations [that fell] due in the ordinary course of business." Id. at 782 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). Geyer did not define insolvency so narrowly: "An entity is insolvent when it is unable to pay its debts
as they fall due in the usual course of business. That is, an entity is insolvent when it has liabilities in excess of a
reasonable market value of assets held .... [T]here may be other definitions of insolvency that are slightly
different .... " 621 A.2d at 789 (citations omitted). Production Resources adds a gloss to the balance sheet
insolvency test indicating that courts may need to consider whether there is a reasonable prospect that the
business can successfully continue in the face of insolvency. This raises the question of the extent to which
Production Resources establishes rules for insolvent corporations that have a reasonable prospect of successful
continuation.
27. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 790 n.57. The court noted that real world situations are not akin
to directors putting cash into slot machines, but involve different choices between the pursuit of plausible, but
risky, business strategies that might generate shareholder equity and less risky strategies that guaranty that
there will be no return for shareholders but only preservation of value for creditors. Further, different classes of
creditors have disparate interests, with some creditors being akin to shareholders and preferring risky strategies.
Id.
One suspects from the tone of Production Resources that Vice-Chancellor Strine was uncomfortable with
the "creditor shift" concept but was bound to honor precedent and sought to limit the effect of that precedent.
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assets will be used to pay creditors, usually either by seniority of debt or on a
pro rata basis among debtors [sic] of equal priority.
In insolvency, creditors, as residual claimants to a definitionally-inadequate
pool of assets become exposed to substantial risk as the entity goes forward;
poor decisions by management may erode the value of the remaining assets,
leaving the corporation with even less capital to satisfy its debts in an ultimate
dissolution. The elimination of the stockholders' interest in the firm and the
increased risk to creditors is said to justify imposing fiduciary obligations to-
wards the company's creditors on the directors.2"
Notwithstanding its conclusion that directors of insolvent corporations "owe fi-
duciary duties to the company's creditors," the court held that this does not change
the nature of the harm in a fiduciary breach claim.29 Even with respect to insolvent
corporations, fiduciary breaches continue to be harmful to the entity and are deriv-
ative in nature.3" Therefore, the court held that directors may assert the same de-
28. Id. at 790-91 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). I note here that Vice-Chancellor Strine's "are said
to" language seems equivocal and leaves one to wonder what he would have ruled without Geyer's precedent.
See U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc. v. U.S. Timberlands Klamath Falls, L.L.C., 864 A.2d 930, 947 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(defendant admitted that fiduciary duties extend to creditor interests when firm is insolvent, but contested
insolvency).
29. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 791-92. The court also followed Asmussen v. Quaker City Corp.,
156 A. 180 (Del. Ch. 1931), and stated that "the mere fact that directors of an insolvent firm favor certain
creditors over others of similar priority does not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, absent self-dealing."
Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 791-92 (footnote omitted). This leaves hanging the question of whether
creditors can claim fiduciary breaches when directors act in a manner that favors creditors over others of a
lower priority. Such claims might not be derivative in nature.
30. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 792. The court stated:
More to the current point, the transformation of a creditor into a residual owner does not
change the nature of the harm in a typical claim for breach of fiduciary duty by corporate directors.
Two.examples will illustrate this. Assume that a corporation, say an airline, is already insolvent but
that it has ongoing operations. A well-pled claim is made by one of the company's many creditors
that the directors have engaged in self-dealing. Is this claim a direct claim belonging to the corpora-
tion's creditors as a class, or the specific complaining creditor, such that any monetary recovery
would go directly to them, or it? I would think that it is not. Instead, because of the firm's insolvency,
creditors would have standing to assert that the self-dealing directors had breached their fiduciary
duties by improperly harming the economic value of the firm, to the detriment of the creditors who
had legitimate claims on its assets. No particular creditor would have the right to the recovery; rather,
all creditors would benefit when the firm was made whole and the firm's value was increased, ena-
bling it to satisfy more creditor claims in order of their legal claim on the firm's assets. In other
words, even in the case of an insolvent firm, poor decisions by directors that lead to a loss of corpo-
rate assets and are alleged to be [sic] breaches of equitable fiduciary duties remain harms to the
corporate entity itself. Thus, regardless of whether they are brought by creditors when a company is
insolvent, these claims remain derivative, with either shareholders or creditors suing to recover for a
harm done to the corporation as an economic entity and any recovery logically flows to the corpora-
tion and benefits the derivative plaintiffs indirectly to the extent of their claim on the firm's assets.
The reason for this bears repeating-the fact of insolvency does not change the primary object of the
director's duties, which is the firm itself. The firm's insolvency simply makes the creditors the princi-
pal constituency injured by any fiduciary breaches that diminish the firm's value and logically gives
them standing to pursue these claims to rectify that injury. Put simply, when a director of an insol-
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fenses as they could assert in a shareholder derivative action, and that exculpatory
charter provisions continue to insulate the directors from duty of care claims pur-
suant to §102(b)(7)." Production Resources, therefore, can be viewed narrowly as a
standing case, in which creditors of insolvent corporations are provided standing to
pursue in derivative fashion the corporation's claims that fiduciary breaches dimin-
ished the firm's value.32 On the other hand, the Production Resources holding is
capable of a broader reading in which directors must undertake actions that are
best for the creditors, but not necessarily for other stakeholders or the firm "as a
legal and economic entity," in Credit Lyonnais' words.33
Unlike Chancellor Allen in Credit Lyonnais, Vice Chancellor Strine did not pro-
vide a theoretical underpinning for his conclusion that "when a firm has reached
the point of insolvency .... directors are said to owe fiduciary duties to the com-
pany's creditors."34 Instead, Vice Chancellor Strine appears to have adopted a sim-
ple "if/then" analysis-if insolvent, then duties shift to creditors. This approach
does not provide enlightenment concerning why duties arise and, therefore, is not
helpful in determining how the Delaware Chancery Court is likely to approach
cases that do not come within Production Resources' factual setting, including zone-
of-insolvency situations and even situations when the entity is balance-sheet insol-
vent but there is a "reasonable prospect that the business can be successfully contin-
ued in the face thereof."3" Production Resources also does not provide guidance on
the nature of the duty to creditors and the firm.
vent corporation, through a breach of fiduciary duty, injures the firm itself, the claim against the
director is still one belonging to the corporation.
Id. See In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 323 B.R. 345, 386- 87 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). Although the Production
Resources court left open the possibility of direct creditor claims where directors "display such a marked degree
of animus toward a particular creditor with a proven entitlement payment," Prod. Res. Groups, L.L.C., 863 A.2d
at 798, subsequent Delaware cases have narrowed that possibility by requiring the court to focus on whether
the creditor has, first, pled facts demonstrating, with a high degree of certainty, that it is entitled to payment
and that the entitlement is currently or imminently due, and, second, pled facts showing invidious conduct by
directors. See, e.g., Big Lots Stores, Inc. v. Bain Capital Fund VII, LLC, No. Civ. A. 1081-N, 2006 WL 846121
(Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2006); N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, No. Civ. A. 1456-N,
2006 WL 2588971 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2006).
31. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 793-95. See Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 342 (2d Cir. 2005)
(bankruptcy trustee's breach claims subject to exculpatory clause defense); Continuing Creditors' Comm. of
Star Telecomms., Inc. v. Edgecomb, 385 F. Supp. 2d 449, 463 (D. Del. 2004) (stating that "exculpation clauses
do indeed apply to prevent creditors as well as shareholders from bringing duty of care claims").
32. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 793-95. The court also stated that"[tlhe fact that the corporation
has become insolvent does not turn such claims into direct creditor claims, it simply provides creditors with
standing to assert those claims." Id. at 776.
33. Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
34. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 790-91.
35. Id. at 782. Interestingly, this definition of insolvency may turn full circle to the original "creditor shift"
cases, founded in trust fund theory, in which the duty to creditors arose upon corporate liquidation. See, e.g.,
Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U.S. 371, 383 (1893); Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436-38 (D.
Me. 1824) (creditor duties arise upon corporate liquidation). It raises the question of what occurs in other
cases in which the corporation is insolvent but not liquidating or considered by the court to be on the brink of
liquidation. Perhaps, as it retreats from zone-of-insolvency analysis, the Delaware courts will limit the creditor
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D. The Underlying Basis for Creditor Shifts
To the extent articulated in Credit Lyonnais and Production Resources, the theory for
a "creditor shift" in fiduciary duty enforcement for insolvent corporations appears
to be the following: (i) shareholders are generally residual claimants; (ii) because
they are residual claimants, shareholders are generally the only persons able to en-
force corporate fiduciary duties; (iii) in insolvency situations, creditors become the
residual claimants; (iv) therefore, creditors are able to enforce corporate fiduciary
duties in insolvency cases.36 Thus, the "creditor shift" appears to be based on pay-
ment priority rather than some other underlying theory of fiduciary duty. When
there is no equity value, creditors receive the benefit-and bear the cost-of man-
agement decisions before the shareholders do and, therefore, fiduciary obligations
shift to the creditors. Because increases in firm value go to creditors until the firm
is solvent, the creditors and not the shareholders have certain rights traditionally
associated with ownership. 7 Although Delaware courts have included fiduciary du-
ties among these rights, the deemed ownership shift based on priority is imperfect.
For example, shareholders continue to elect directors, thereby setting up the di-
lemma for the directors because they have a loyalty to shareholders based on cor-
38porate structure.
E. Going to the Extreme-Colorado's Experience with the Creditor Shift
The Production Resources decision was appropriately judicious in cabining the effect
of the creditor shift. There can be no assurance, however, that courts in other states
will not seize on broader concepts raised in the Delaware cases (along with broad
fiduciary duty language contained in the Delaware cases) and give creditors of in-
solvent entities a much larger field in which to operate. Certainly, such has been the
effect in Colorado, at least as of this writing. In Anstine v. Alexander,39 a bankruptcy
trustee sued the president of a corporation and the president's legal counsel, alleg-
ing that the president breached his fiduciary duties by warehousing home-warranty
premiums tendered to the corporation, after the policies purchased by the corpora-
tion to secure such warranties were found to be fraudulent, and then transferring
shift to liquidation cases. The court did not tip its hat to this ironical conclusion, however. In North American
Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, the court refused to extend the trust fund
doctrine to permit direct creditor claims in zone of insolvency settings and noted that such an extension would
create minimal benefit to creditors and significant costs to economic efficiency. No. Civ. A. 1456-N, 2006 WL
2588971, at "12.
36. See In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., 274 B.R. 71, 89 (D. Del. 2002) (stating that "when a corporation
enters the zone of insolvency, the creditors-and not just the shareholders-are residual risk bearers whose
recovery is dependent upon business decisions of the directors"). Fundamentally, the Hechinger court noted,
the directors of such a firm are "playing with the creditors [sic] money." Id.
37. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 647,
665-68 (1996).
38. If there is a creditor shift with respect to fiduciary duties, perhaps there should also be a creditor shift
with respect to director selection.
39. 128 P.3d 249 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005), rev'd, 152 P.3d 497 (Colo. Feb. 20, 2007).
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the escrowed premiums offshore to obtain replacement insurance. ° The president's
legal counsel was sued, and found liable in a jury trial, for aiding and abetting the
president's breach of fiduciary duties by advising the president to warehouse the
premiums and assisting the president to use those premiums to purchase unaccept-
able offshore policies. The Colorado Court of Appeals first addressed whether the
corporation's bankruptcy trustee had standing to pursue the claim of aiding and
abetting a fiduciary breach." In a truncated opinion, and without citing to substan-
tial authority, the court held:
We agree with the trial court and conclude that [Trustee has] standing as a
fictitious judgment lien creditor. Here, any hypothetical judgment lien creditor
would have standing to sue the attorneys for malpractice causing injury to
BHW and to sue BHW's president for breach of his fiduciary duty to BHW
and, if BHW was insolvent, for breach of his fiduciary duty to BHW's credi-
tors. Such a lien creditor would also have a cause of action against anyone who
aided and abetted that breach of fiduciary duty.42
The court then cemented its conclusion that creditors of insolvent corporations
have direct, rather than derivative, fiduciary claims against officers and directors by
stating that defenses that the president might assert against the corporation could
not be asserted in the context of a creditor claim.43 Thus, at least in Colorado,
creditors of insolvent corporations can bring direct actions against corporate of-
ficers and directors in certain circumstances, and thereby render useless defenses
that could otherwise be asserted in derivative cases. Anstine has provoked an equal
and opposite reaction from the Colorado corporate bar, and in 2006 legislation was
enacted to move creditor claims back inside the derivative box. The Colorado legis-
lation provides "[a] director or officer of a corporation, in the performance of
40. Id. at 252-53. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed Anstine, holding that officers and directors of
insolvent Colorado corporations owe creditors a duty only to avoid favoring their own interests over creditor
claims, and that there had been no allegations of self-interested behavior. It seems that the president's actions
may have been for the corporation's best interests, or at least protected under the business judgment rule, but
the court's decision contains no discussion of this aspect of the case. Anstine can be compared unfavorably with
the Supreme Court of Canada's People's Department decision, in which the Court held:
The directors' fiduciary duty does not change when a corporation is in the nebulous "vicinity of
insolvency." That phrase has not been defined; moreover, it is incapable of definition and has no legal
meaning. What it is obviously intended to convey is a deterioration in the corporation's financial
stability. In assessing the actions of directors it is evident that any honest and good faith attempt to
redress the corporation's financial problems will, if successful, both retain value for shareholders and
improve the position of the creditors. If unsuccessful, it will not qualify as a breach of the statutory
fiduciary duty.
In re Peoples Dep't Stores, Inc. [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, 483.
41. Anstine, 128 P.3d at 253-54.
42. Id. at 254 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
43. Id.
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duties in that capacity, shall not have any fiduciary duty to any creditor of the
corporation arising only from the status as a creditor.""
The Colorado legislation is intended to undo the effects of Anstine and would
clarify that directors owe no fiduciary duty to corporate creditors. Instead, such
creditors would need to proceed against directors who breached their fiduciary
duties by other means. These could include a derivative action or foreclosure on the
corporation's right of action against its directors with subsequent litigation of the
corporation's claim, and directors would retain such defenses as they might have
against claims brought by the corporation.
II. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST
THE CREDITOR SHIFT
The "F" word-fiduciary-is not a throwaway,45 and because there can be major
ramifications when the term is introduced, courts should be very careful to use the
term only when it is appropriate. Simply put, if a person in a particular relationship
with another is subject to a fiduciary relationship, that person must be loyal to the
interests of the other person. As noted by Deborah DeMott:
In general terms, the law governing fiduciary obligation addresses two ques-
tions: First, in what circumstances does fiduciary obligation apply? Second,
what does the obligation require a person to do? If a person in a particular
relationship with another is subject to a fiduciary obligation, that person (the
fiduciary) must be loyal to the interests of the other person (the beneficiary).
The fiduciary's duties go beyond mere fairness and honesty; they oblige him to
act to further the beneficiary's best interests. The fiduciary must avoid acts that
put his interests in conflict with the beneficiary's. For example, if the fiduciary
contracts with the beneficiary, the contract is voidable by the beneficiary unless
the fiduciary has disclosed his interests adequately under the circumstances. If
the fiduciary benefits through acts inconsistent with his obligation of fidelity,
the beneficiary can recover any benefit realized by the fiduciary unless he con-
sents to the fiduciary's retention of it. In transactions between the fiduciary
and the beneficiary, therefore, the fiduciary must be candid and must evince
utmost good faith.
To be sure, the ramifications of these basic principles are complex, as may be
the determination whether, in a particular relationship, a fiduciary obligation
exists in the first place. Only confusion will result if a court grounds its ap-
proach in a mistaken conception of fiduciary obligation."
44. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 7-108-401(5) (2006).
45. Instead, the "F" word is a "fighting" word.
46. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 882
(1988) (citations omitted).
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There are several theoretical and practical arguments against recognizing that
creditors of insolvent firms have fiduciary claims against directors, officers, and
managers of such firms. On the theoretical side, the creditor shift is not supported
by classical theories of fiduciary duty. On the practical side, the creditor shift cre-
ates unacceptable uncertainty, ambiguity and unfairness. Therefore, this Article en-
courages retreat from using the term fiduciary to describe relationships with
creditors of insolvent entities.
A. The Creditor Shift Is Not Supported by Classical Theories of Fiduciary Duty
Two leading academic approaches to fiduciary duty have emerged-contractarian
and fiduciarian 4 7-and the creditor shift is supported by neither. In each case, there
is recognition that the internal structure of business entities creates relationships of
power and dependency, and that the law has attempted to provide a principled set
of regulations to ensure that those with power are accountable to those who de-
pend on its appropriate exercise.4" The question becomes the foundation of (and
limitations on) the power and dependency relationship. Theoretical discussions of
fiduciary duty recurringly focus on whether restrictions on managerial behavior
are, or should be, derived from moral notions or, alternatively, from simple con-
tract. Specifically, the question is whether fiduciary relationships have meaning be-
yond the parties' contract or whether the conditions generating the fiduciary
relationship impose restrictions on the parties that classic contract doctrine would
not require or permit.
Contractarians argue that fiduciary duties should be confined to relationships
that involve the contractual delegation of broad and open-ended (i.e., not subject
47. 1 use the term fiduciarian rather than the alternative term anticontractarian because I believe it is less
conclusory and does not imply that the concepts reposed by fiduciarians arose in negative response to the
"bundle of contracts" theory of the firm. J. William Callison, Blind Men and Elephants: Fiduciary Duties Under
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and Beyond, 1 j. SMALL & EMERG-
ING Bus. L. 109, 117 n.53 (1997). See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corpo-
rate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1618 (1989) (drawing similar distinction between
those that view American corporate law as primarily composed of mandatory rules that the shareholders can-
not modify and those that view corporate law as composed of waivable default rules, and arguing for an
information-revealing approach of "coercive" default rules). Coffee also notes the major dispute separating
contractarians and fiduciarians:
Put simply, fiduciary law is deeply intertwined with notions of morality and the desire to preserve a
traditional form of relationship. One side believes deeply in the moral tradition of the fiduciary
relationship, while the other is equally convinced of the justice of its libertarian position that the
parties should be the sovereign masters of their own relationship.
What is there then in traditional fiduciary law from which rational parties might wish to devi-
ate? The traditional fiduciary ethic insists that the fiduciary act selflessly. At bottom, the anticon-
tractarians believe not only that the beneficiaries desire such a relationship, but that a public morality
requires its preservation. Two visions of society here collide: the individualistic, wealth-maximizing
view of the economist and the communitarian ethic of the moralist.
Id. at 1658 (footnote omitted).
48. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675,
1675 (1990).
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to limitations and constraints such as active monitoring or approval power) power
over one's property.49 Thus, the existence of fiduciary duties depends on the struc-
ture of the parties' relationship, as expressed by their actual or implied contract,
and not on exogenous vulnerabilities or other sources." Contractarians further ar-
gue that fiduciary duties constitute a response to the impossibility of writing con-
tracts that completely specify the parties' obligations."' Thus, contractarians
conclude that the "fiduciary" relationship is a contractual gap-filler, characterized
by high costs of specification and monitoring, in which the courts prescribe the
actions the parties, who are presumed to be rational and wealth-maximizing per-
sons, would have preferred if bargaining were cheap and promises fully enforced."2
The contractarian conception of fiduciary duty works in the interstices of power,
specifically the power to contract and to meaningfully negotiate and document the
pertinent terms of the contract. When parties have bargaining power together with
an ability to express their rights and obligations there would be no fiduciary duty.
The contractarian approach directly implicates concepts of fiduciary duty to credi-
tors, at least to voluntary creditors. As noted by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel
Fischel, creditors are able to contract at low cost, and fiduciary duties should not
run to them. 3 The most significant class of creditors, lenders, are able to protect
themselves through the exercise of bargaining power and the negotiation of security
49. See Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 212. Ribstein argues:
[Djefault fiduciary duties should be confined to relationships that involve the contractual delegation
of broad power over one's property. Broad delegation means management power that is not subject
to limitations or constraints such as the purported owner's active monitoring or approval power, or a
debtor's duty to repay, and pay interest on, a loan. Fiduciary duties are appropriate for relationships
like those between directors and shareholders in public corporations. They do not fit relationships
among parties who expect to be active, as in the typical general partnership. Moreover, the existence
of default fiduciary duties depends solely on the structure of the parties' relationship-that is, on the
terms of their express or implied contract-and not on any vulnerability arising other than from this
structure.
Id. See generally D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399
(2002).
50. See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. & ECON. 425, 427
(1993) (noting that "Ifliduciary duties are not special duties; they have no moral footing; they are the same sort
of obligations, derived and enforced in the same way, as other contractual undertakings. Actual contracts
always prevail over implied ones. Obligations implied to maximize value in high-transactions-costs cases may
have some things in common, but differences in the underlying transactions will call for different 'fiduciary'
obligations, just as actual contracts differ across markets" [footnote omitted]).
51. Id. at 426.
52. Id. at 427.
53. Specifically, Easterbrook and Fischel note that, "[mlanagers owe fiduciary duties to equity investors,
but not debt investors or employees, because these claimants can contract at low cost, while the costs of
specification are prohibitively high for the residual claimants." Id. at 437 (citations omitted). In Are Partners
Fiduciaries?, Larry Ribstein refrains from addressing the insolvency question in detail and notes that "the ap-
propriate way to protect the creditors is through a 'good faith' duty that enforces the creditors' expectations by
flexibly interpreting the specific terms of the debt agreement .... Fiduciary-like duties to creditors are appro-
priate, at most, only when the firm nears insolvency, where the creditors may be, in effect, residual claimants."
Ribstein, supra note 49, at 226.
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interests in firm assets.54 Lenders also are protected by the firm's duty to perform
its contracts in good faith. Further, in the contractarian view, imposition of fiduci-
ary duties comes with cost. In the case of director duties to creditors, the cost to the
corporation and its shareholders include the costs of obtaining skilled directors at
the time when it most needs them-either the corporation would not be able to
obtain directors willing to bear the personal risk, which is magnified by the lack of
clear definition of duties, or the firm will need to pay more to directors or bear
increased insurance costs.
Fiduciarian legal scholars consider fiduciary duties through a different lens. Pro-
fessor Melvin Eisenberg succinctly states the fiduciarian approach:
All law builds on moral, policy, and experiential propositions .... The moral
proposition that underlies the law of negligence is that if a person assumes a
role whose performance involves the risk of injury to others, he is under a
moral duty to perform that role carefully. . . A moral obligation to exercise
care in the performance of one's role is also imposed on corporate directors and
officers. 55
As noted by another leading fiduciarian, contractarians begin with the assumption
that the state imposes only thinly textured restrictions on the contracting parties'
behavior vis-A-vis one another before and in performance of their contract, while
fiduciarians begin by contemplating the thick state-imposed restrictions that sub-
stantially hamper the parties' freedom to act (contractually or otherwise) or to alter
their obligations to their beneficiaries. 6 Fiduciarians accept that values other than
54. For example, creditors who fear insolvency may seek a higher interest rate and may seek to influence
firm management through proxy rights and board representation. Their bargaining power may be superior to
the firm's.
55. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Officers and Directors, 51 U. PIr. L. REV. 945, 945,
948 (1990) (footnote omitted). See generally DeMott, supra note 46.
56. Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595, 597-98 (1997).
Brudney notes:
To characterize the state-imposed limits as "default" rules or "background" rules suggests that the
parties are free to ignore, or decline to be bound by, restrictions that society imposes to protect
individuals, whether paternalistically, or to avoid externalities, or otherwise. The suggestion is that
parties are as free to "contract" with one another as they would be in a pre-state world with no
socially-imposed restrictions. That basic structural assumption is problematic. Some of those back-
ground rules are not permitted to be circumvented by the parties; others are. Even in the latter case,
the existence of state-imposed background rules limits the parties' power to "contract around" them
(in whole or in part) or to treat their arrangements as if the rules did not exist.
Id. at 597-98. See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, and
the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 824 (1999). Eisenberg states:
Unfortunately, it has proved easy to confuse the positive proposition that the corporation is a
nexus of reciprocal arrangements with the normative proposition that the persons who constitute a
corporation should be free to make whatever reciprocal arrangements they choose, without the con-
straints of any mandatory legal rules .... To reason from the nexus-of-contracts conception to a
rejection of mandatory legal rules is to mistakenly reason from is to ought.
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
J. WILLIAM CALLISON
wealth-maximization, including trust values, are served by the visions of human
relationships underlying fiduciary concepts and that the fiduciary relationship
serves functions not addressed by mere contract."
Notwithstanding their view that fiduciary duties arise independently from con-
tract, some fiduciarians recognize that parties may change the scope of fiduciary
duties by contract, at least to some extent5 s Concepts of volition and cognition
help determine the malleability of fiduciary duties, and contracts can vary duties
among those that have these powers.5 Thus, the common public stockholder needs
robust and less modifiable fiduciary obligations because he or she is relatively una-
ble to specify the opportunistic behavior against which protection is required or,
because of a lack of information, to monitor decisions made pursuant to contrac-
tual restrictions or to enforce compliance with contractual terms. ° On the other
hand, it is strongly arguable that in the fiduciarian construct, duties should not run
to corporate creditors.' First, creditors frequently have both sufficient knowledge
and power to structure their relationships with the corporation and in connection
with its management. Thus, loan agreements can include debt-acceleration provi-
sions allowing lenders to obtain the corporation's assets in the event of insecurity,
lenient receivership provisions, provisions allowing creditors to appoint corporate
directors, and the like.62 Even in the case of creditors that lack power and informa-
tion, Brudney concludes that management represents the shareholders' interests in
conducting corporate affairs, and that corporate managers should not owe fiduci-
Id.
57. Brudney, supra note 56, at 604. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness,
and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1780-89 (2001).
58. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1470 (1989)
(noting that "[tihe core fiduciary rules which govern the close corporation are mandatory, but private rules
that do not present the dangers of systematic unforseeability and exploitation ... normally will be given effect"
[citations omitted]); Brudney, supra note 56, at 605.
59. Brudney, supra note 56, at 612. See also Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the
Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1405 (1985) (arguing that "[diemonstrating the degree of cogni-
tion and volition by parties that is adequate to support the concept of contract which has the implied conse-
quences of autonomy requires solution of complex and intractable problems").
60. Brudney, supra note 56, at 612. Brudney adds that public stockholders also do not have the "capacity
of commercial principal to specify limits, monitor management, select officers" or terminate them. Id.
61. Id. at 611 n.41 (noting that there is room to argue about the allocation of entitlement among various
"stockholders" and that there are several economic reasons to empower common stockholders to vote for
directors, both because they take residual risks and because of their inability to adequately specify or monitor
threats to their residual interest, and concluding that these reasons and the accompanying corporate structure
imply that management's fiduciary obligations should run to stockholders rather than other participants in the
corporate enterprise).
62. In addition, creditors can ameliorate their risks by charging higher interest rates, lending on a short-
term basis, taking appropriate collateral, and obtain appropriate negative covenants preventing the firm from
taking actions that are perceived as risky or paying out'assets to shareholders as dividends. Although it might
not be possible to anticipate the risks of debtor opportunism at the time the loan is made, shareholders are
more at risk from opportunism than are creditors because many things that can reduce the firm's value will not
reduce the value of its debt. Some creditors, such as trade creditors, lend on a relatively short-term basis and do
not need fiduciary protections; in the event of trouble, they can stop doing business with the firm or establish
cash on delivery or other payment terms.
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ary duties to creditors because that would establish an intractable conflict.63 There-
63. Brudney writes:
If there is little basis for imposing on common stockholders fiduciary loyalty obligations to
seniors [senior debt holders] in dealing with the enterprise's distribution or investment policy or
capital structure, there is little more basis for imposing such obligations on management. If the
matter is viewed structurally, and management is seen as the agent (albeit indirect) of the common
stockholders vis-a-vis [sic] seniors, management should not owe to senior security holders fiduciary
obligations that preclude it from favoring common stockholders any more than does its principal.
Similarly, if management is seen as the agent of "the corporation," that status imposes restraints on
management's self-aggrandizing or careless behavior. But the case remains to be made as to why in
managing corporate affairs managers incur fiduciary obligations to the seniors, or indeed any differ-
ent obligations than the common stock does in choosing management or otherwise directing corpo-
rate affairs.
The conflict of interest between debt and equity over investment or distribution policy or capital
structure implicates the economic question of whether the goal of the corporate decision-maker
should be to maximize stockholders' value rather than enterprise (and possibly creditors') value if its
decision affects those values differently. Traditional fiduciary stricture suggests that the proper decision
for management to take is to favor commons' interest, at least until the enterprise is insolvent or reaches
"the vicinity of insolvency." At that time, or possibly earlier, it may be necessary and appropriate for the
corporate decision-making body (the board and management) to reconcile the interests of the competing
claims of stockholders and creditors (and other stakeholders) in maximizing the enterprise's value. If so,
that body should by law (1) be so instructed, and furnished with appropriate criteria for decision, and (2)
be constituted of appropriately weighted representatives of each class of claimants. The costs of thus
requiring a regime of bargaining at the board room table may well be considerably less than the costs
of making the same persons arbiters for conflicting interests with accountability to none. So long as
the board is constructed only of representatives of common stock, that constituency has a claim on its.
institutional loyalty as fiduciary that is logically prior to any comparable claim by seniors.
If the fiduciary role is viewed as constraining managerial slack or diversion of assets to itself, as
distinguished from managerial favoring of the interests of commons over those of seniors, a some-
what different problem is presented. To the extent that such managerial conduct renders the corpora-
tion unable to meet its contractual obligations to seniors (e.g., to pay interest or dividends or
principal), seniors are entitled to relief from actual default in meeting those obligations. In that
process, they may be entitled to assert that management violated its fiduciary obligations to the
common stockholders (who in that context are equivalent to "the corporation") and, because recov-
ery for that violation is an asset of "the corporation" which should cushion, if not be allocated to, the
seniors, they should be entitled to pursue it. But seniors have no claim to receive any of those recov-
ered assets until their contractual entitlement matures. The fact that managerial behavior so depletes
corporate assets as to cause a decline in the prices of senior securities prior to their maturity gives
seniors no more claim to force corporate action against management than they would have against
common stockholders for directing comparably effective behavior. To allow seniors to enforce such
claims when prices drop, but there has been no violation of the contractual obligations of the corporation
or of the common stockholders to them, would interfere with common stockholders' control of the enter-
prise in violation of the essential premises of the arrangements between them-whether the issue arises
with respect to investment policy, asset management or corporate structure.
It should also be noted that intractable problems arise if management is regarded as having,
from whatever source, fiduciary obligations to both common stockholders and seniors. Although the
exclusive benefit principle precludes management from diverting any corporate assets or values from
the beneficiary to itself, it implicates a broader premise: management receives its power and concomi-
tant fiduciary obligation of loyalty for the benefit of the common stock. But that premise cannot be
invoked in deciding how management can or should meet the competing claims of seniors and
juniors if the premise is transmuted into a fiduciary obligation to both of them. The same is true for
the principle of equality if the competing claims are to unequal return (in amount and in priority).
In the absence of relevant contract terms or other instructions, management is left without bounda-
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fore, in the fiduciarians' view, creditors are left with contractual, rather than
fiduciary, protections.
B. The Creditor Shift Creates Unacceptable Ambiguity and Uncertainty
In addition to the theoretical concerns enunciated above, shifting fiduciary duties
to creditors creates undue confusion and uncertainty, and the possibility for unfair-
ness in application.
1. When does a shift occur?
Delaware case law contemplates that the creditor shift begins when a firm enters
the zone of insolvency and continues, presumably with increasing effect, through
the point when the firm is insolvent with no reasonable possibility of continuing as
a going concern. This construct gives rise to large practical issues, fraught with
director risk, of determining when the firm enters (and exits) the various stages of
insolvency. The risk is compounded if there is an actual change in creditor rights
when the firm enters the "zone," as opposed to a Credit Lyonnais-like power of
directors to consider broader constituencies.
In order to determine both insolvency and a descent into the zone of insol-
vency," it becomes necessary to keep a running tally of the firm's asset value and of
the amount of its liabilities.65 Without a liquidation sale, it is inherently difficult to
determine the going-concern value of assets, particularly in the case of complex
assets such as intellectual property and financial assets. Similarly, it is difficult at
times to determine the existence and amount of the firm's liabilities, including
ries set by the parties or the state, and without the support of any signal from the fiduciary notion.
The "fiduciary" in such circumstances sits at large, like a Kadi under a tree.
If in theory the fiduciary concept would offer little or nothing to guide management in allocat-
ing risks and shares between seniors and common stockholders, in practice it might well produce
injury to both sets of putative beneficiaries. As has been pointed out powerfully in the literature, to
give management a role that does not tie it to common stockholders but obligates it to be "fair" to
conflicting claimants is to enable it to play its obligations to one group off against those to the others.
Thus management becomes free to serve its own interests at the expense of all investors or other
stockholders.
Id. at 644-48 (emphases added) (citations and footnotes omitted). See also Victor Brudney, Corporate Bond-
holders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1821, 1837 n.49 (1992) (noting
that the conflict between stockholders' and bondholders' interests does not permit management to owe duties
to both and that "more particularized doctrine" should be used). But see Mitchell, supra note 21, at 1177-86
(arguing for fiduciary duties to corporate bondholders). From the fiduciarians' perspective, bondholders
should be the easiest case for finding fiduciary duties because dispersed bondholders have relatively little power
or knowledge.
64. A recent decision explaining the "zone of insolvency" has held that, in order not to be in the zone, a
corporation must have the ability to obtain enough cash for its projected obligations and fund its business
requirements for working capital and capital expenditures with a reasonable cushion to cover the variability of
its business needs over time. See Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449, 509-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). This standard seems
to be very difficult to apply.
65. Determining insolvency may also require a further determination of whether there is a reasonable
prospect that the firm can be continued in the face of its financial difficulties.
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contingent and unknown liabilities.66 This creates a dangerous situation for direc-
tors, who might err on the conservative side and find insolvency, thereby running
risks that they favor creditors, breaching their duties to shareholders, and operating
the firm inefficiently. Further, by adopting the perspective that directoral decisions
in the zone of insolvency obtain increased protection from shareholder complaint,
directors may seek to establish that the firm is in the zone and obtain greater pro-
tections. It is uncertain, however, where the zone begins and ends.
2. Which creditors should obtain the benefit of a creditor shift?
Creditors are not homogeneous. Some negotiate detailed contracts with the firm,
some do not; some are fully secured with the firm's assets, some have lesser or no
security-, some are voluntary creditors, some are involuntary creditors; some are
protected by law, some are not; some can exit easily from their relationships with
the firm, some cannot. With respect to voluntary, fully secured creditors that have
detailed loan agreements, one can argue that the extension of fiduciary duties cre-
ates a windfall beyond the bargained-for terms.67 Even with respect to other volun-
tary creditors, one can argue that they price their credit terms by reference to the
fact that the firm may be unable to pay and that the firm's directors do not have
duties to them beyond an obligation to treat them in good faith, and, therefore,
that extension of fiduciary duties creates a windfall. Recognizing a fiduciary duty to
ordinary trade creditors, who reach agreements based on oral understandings and
past practices and generally do not bargain concerning contract terms, would place
such creditors ahead of the firm's secured creditors. The law should not do this.
Finally, the fact that creditors are not homogeneous means that they have differ-
ent interests with respect to director decisions. The oversecured creditor may not
care because it will be paid from firm assets regardless of the outcome. The margin-
ally secured creditor may prefer conservative decisions that minimize the risk in
asset liquidation value. The undersecured or unsecured creditor may be in the same
position as a shareholder and prefer risky management decisions, because the re-
ward provided by successful decisions may be the only way to recoup its investment
in the firm. It is likely that the creditors that prefer riskier decisions had low voli-
tion and cognition levels relative to the creditors who entered contracts, and it is
relatively likely that these creditors lack the resources or the desire to assert their
interests through fiduciary duty claims. The result is that questions of fairness and
efficiency remain despite the creditor shift. In addition, the foundation for the
creditor shift appears to be the creditors' interests in residual assets, and there fre-
quently will be questions of which creditor or group of creditors best represent the
residual interest.
66. There is also a question of the role of contingent and future liabilities in the insolvency analysis. See
Stilson, supra note 11, at 13-50.
67. See Big Lots Stores, Inc. v. Bain Capital Fund VII, LLC, No. Civ. A. 1081-N, 2006 WL 846121, at *7-8
(Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2006).
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
J. WILLIAM CALLISON
3. What are the duties?
Delaware case law indicates that there is a zone of insolvency in which directors
may consider the interests of constituencies other than shareholders and that direc-
tors have fiduciary duties to creditors when the firm is insolvent, at least as insol-
vency was defined in Production Resources. The Delaware case law is principally
procedural, however, and does not define the substance of these duties or the inter-
ests to be taken into account. Further, the Delaware cases seem to contemplate a
solvency-insolvency scale in which a downward-spiraling firm enters the zone of
insolvency and exits with liabilities in excess of assets and no reasonable possibility
of recovery. It is likely that fiduciary duties shift along the scale and even that an
insolvent but improving firm may enter the zone of insolvency where directors are
protected from creditor suit if they take shareholder interests into account in mak-
ing decisions. The result is a multivariate analysis that, without clear definition by
the courts or the legislature, is too difficult to comprehend or administer.6"
In addition, there is a question of whether corporate law concepts that protect
directors against shareholder fiduciary claims, such as the business judgment rule,
continue to apply when directors owe fiduciary duties to creditors. Although the
Delaware Chancery Court has held that "there is room for application of the busi-
ness judgment rule" in insolvency cases,69 there is authority to the effect that direc-
tors of insolvent firms hold a fiduciary duty as trustees to protect assets for the
creditors' benefit.7" If directors are or become akin to trustees, trust principles
rather than corporate law principles might be applied in defining their duties.7'
Courts have been divided as to whether the business judgment rule, as opposed to
"trust fund" standards, should apply to insolvent corporations.72
4. What about closely held corporations, limited partnerships, and limited liability
companies?
In addition to publicly held companies in which fiduciary duties are generally inca-
pable of contractual modification, the business organization universe is full of
other forms, specifically closely held corporations, limited partnerships, and lim-
68. See Brudney, supra note 56, at 645-46 (recognizing possible creditor shift and arguing that the board
of directors should by law be instructed as to its obligations and furnished with appropriate criteria for deci-
sions, and should consist of appropriately weighted representatives of each class of claimants).
69. Angelo, Gordon & Co., L.P. v. Allied Riser Commc'ns Corp., 805 A.2d 221, 229 (Del. Ch. 2002).
70. See Jewel Recovery, L.P. v. Gordon, 196 B.R. 348, 354 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Comm. of the Creditors of
Xonics Med. Sys., Inc. v. Haverty (In re Xonics, Inc.), 99 B.R. 870, 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that
directors become trustees but applying business judgment rule standards).
71. One is left wondering whether substantive duties might shift as the firm moves from the "zone,"
through insolvency with a chance of continuation, to insolvency with no reasonable possibility of continuation.
The latter situation is most like that of the "trust fund" cases.
72. Compare Steinberg v. Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc.), 225 B.R. 646, 655-56 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1998) (business judgment rule applicable), with Miramar Res., Inc. v. Schultz (In re Schultz), 208 B.R.
723, 729 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (applying trust fund doctrines).
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ited liability companies, in which the emerging consensus is that fiduciary duties
are capable of modification by agreement.73 Delaware has been a leader in establish-
ing this consensus, and in 2004 the Delaware Legislature enacted amendments to its
version of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act and its Limited Liability
Company Act permitting partners and members to restrict or eliminate most fidu-
ciary duties contractually as long as the implied contractual covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is not eliminated.7 4 Further, the Delaware statutes protect partners,
members, and managers that in good faith rely on the provisions of their partner-
ship agreement or limited liability company agreement.7" It is likely that similar
rules will apply to close corporations in which shareholders bargain concerning the
precise fiduciary obligations owed by firm management.
It also is likely that the creditor shift will apply to closely held corporations,
limited partnerships, and limited liability companies in which equity owners are
protected from personal liability for managerial actions.76 It is unclear, however,
how statutory amendments and judicial developments permitting the modification
or even elimination of fiduciary duties will affect creditors' rights when the firm is
insolvent or in the zone of insolvency. For example, if a limited liability company
agreement eliminates the members' and managers' duty of loyalty or duty of care,
are the creditors' rights to sue for breaches also eliminated? Because limited liability
companies are creatures of contract governed by operating agreements that are
freely amendable by the members, can an operating agreement be amended while
the firm is in the zone of insolvency (or immediately before it enters the zone) to
modify or eliminate fiduciary duties to the company and its members, and hence
its creditors? How do statutory provisions addressing the effect of partnership
agreements and operating agreements on "third parties" limit the ability of mem-
bers to alter the managers' fiduciary obligations in a manner that affects creditors'
rights?77 I suspect that some states, such as Delaware, will conclude that creditors'
rights will follow the owners' agreement and that other states, such as Colorado,
under the Anstine case, will give less leeway to the parties' agreement.
73. See Revised Uniform Partnership Act, § 103(a) (1997) ("Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(b), relations among the partners and between the partners and the partnership are governed by the partner-
ship agreement. To the extent the partnership agreement does not otherwise provide, this [Act] governs rela-
tions among the partners and between the partners and the partnership."); Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
§ 110(a) (2001); Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, § 103(a) (1996).
74. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-103(0 (2005) (providing that a "partnership agreement may provide
for the limitation or elimination of any and all liabilities for breach of contract and breach of duties (including
fiduciary duties)"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c).
75. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-103(0 (2005).
76. See U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc. v. U.S. Timberlands Klamath Falls, L.L.C., 864 A.2d 930, 949 (Del. Ch.
2004) (denying motion to dismiss creditors' fiduciary duty claims against manager of allegedly insolvent lim-
ited liability company); Bren v. Capital Realty Group Senior Hous., Inc., No. Civ.A. 19902-NC, 2004 WL
370214, at *4-6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 2004) (note holder was owed fiduciary duty by general partner when limited
partnership became insolvent).
77. See Robert R. Keatinge, The Partnership Agreement and Third Parties: ReRULPA Section 11O(b)(13) v.
RUPA Section 103(b)(10), 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 873, 877 (2004).
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
J. WILLIAM CALLISON
I1. CONCLUSION
The courts' recent move to create fiduciary duties to creditors in insolvency situa-
tions is flawed in principle and unworkable in practice, and should be reversed.
This should not be grounds for despair among creditors because they continue to
enjoy legal protections traditionally provided to them pursuant to contract law and
under traditional creditors' remedies laws. Creditors should negotiate for those
protections that they deem fit for their particular relationship with the debtor, and
should proceed to use bankruptcy, receivership, and foreclosure protections in the
event the debtor entity is unable to meet its obligations.
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